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Abstract 
Links between security and migration are well-established and are associated with the 
meaning, status and practice of borders in the international political system. This article 
assesses how and with what effects the effects of environmental and climate change have 
entered this relationship between migration and security. It does so by assessing thĞh ?Ɛ
external governance of migration ŝŶ  ‘^ŽƵƚŚ DĞĚŝƚĞƌƌĂŶĞĂŶ WĂƌƚŶĞƌ ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?  ?^DWƐ ? P
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. It is argued 
that a focus on promoting  ‘adaptation ? and building  ‘resilience ? has developed that is 
consistent with the logic of governing migration from a distance. However, the article 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ŝĚĞĂƐ ƚŚĂƚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ?ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ĂĐƚĂƐ ƐŝŵƉůĞ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌƐ ? ĂŶĚ
instead explores implications of movement towards and not away from risk, as well as the 
potential for populations to be trapped in areas that expose them to risk. It is shown that 
both have important implications for the relationship between migration, 
environmental/climate change and security in SMPCs.  
 
Introduction 
This article analyses the ways in which the construction of  ‘new security challenges ? in south 
Mediterranean countries contribute to the development of the external dimension of 
European Union (EU) migration governance and of broader strategies of  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ? Žƌ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐmigration ĨƌŽŵ Ă ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?. In particular, the article focuses on 
the definition of environmental and climate change as new security challenges with 
potential implications for migration, ĨŽƌƚŚĞh ?Ɛ'ůŽďĂůƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽDŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚDŽďŝůŝƚǇ
(GAMM, CEC, 2011) and for the Strategic Guidelines on Migration and Asylum agreed by the 
member states in June 2014. As such, the article deals with classic transboundary issues  W 
migration and environmental change - that render problematic the status and meaning of 
borders in international politics but that are also entangled with the meaning and practice 
of security in the international system.  As will be shown, research evidence now challenges 
previous simplistic assumptions about environmental change as a potential  ‘ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌ ? ĨŽƌ
mass migration. Instead, the evidence suggests that the challenges are more complicated 
than first thought but, as will be shown, they are also closely connected with the 
development of the external dimension of EU migration governance and have become 
linked to efforts to govern migration from a distance. The paper thus draws from work on 
EU external governance that focuses on situations ǁŚĞƌĞ P ‘ƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ?ůĞŐĂůďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ
ŝƐ ŵŽǀĞĚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƌĐůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĞŵďĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?  ?>ĂǀĞŶĞǆ ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ?Governance is 
understood to possess a dual meaning both as the conceptual representation of social 
systems and the empirical analysis of their capacity to adapt (Pierre, 200). This privileges no 
particular site or location for governance and is thus open both to the transboundary nature 
of both migration and environmental change as well as to the new venues and locations for 
migration governance that emerge as a result of transgovernmental co-operation in this 
field. Building on recent work both in the fields of environmental science and international 
relations, the article shows how this strategy of governing migration from a distance is 
becoming associated with ideas linked to human security including vulnerability, adaptation 
3 
 
and resilience, their sources and potential solutions. /ƚ ĚŽĞƐ ƐŽ ďǇ ĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
external governance of migration ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ  ‘^ŽƵƚŚ DĞĚŝƚĞƌƌĂŶĞĂŶ WĂƌƚŶĞƌ ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? 
(SMPCs): Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia. The 
article focuses on both internal and international migration in SMPCs because internal 
migration is far more significant in scale than international migration and often takes the 
form of rural-urban migration that raises questions that tend not to be associated with 
migration policy, such as urban governance and the sustainability of rural livelihoods. In 
ecological terms, SMPCs comprise drylands, coastal zones and mountains. There is exposure 
to the effects of both rapid- and slow-onset environmental change that is likely to lead to an 
extension of arid land and increased desertification in SMPCs.  
 
The questions addressed by this article are, first, how and in what ways did environmental 
change and migration governance become defined as security challenges? What was the 
perceived nature of the challenge and how has new research questioned the epistemic 
foundations of these initial perceptions. Following from this, the article then explores the 
ways in which scientific and research evidence about links between environmental change 
and migration have informed perceptions of the challenges associated with the h ?Ɛ
external governance of migration but has done so with important implications for a broader 
set of policies linked to ideas about  ‘vulnerability ?,  ‘adaptation ? and  ‘resilience ?, which, as 
operational concepts, can be linked to the expression of EU power in the international 
system and new ways of framing the security issue.  
 
The argument is developed as follows. It is shown that environmental change can drive 
migration in SMPCs, but its effects are likely to be made evident through interaction with 
other economic, social, political and demographic drivers of migration.  This means that it is 
ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ƚŽ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚ Ă ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŚĂƚ ĨĂůů ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ŽĨ  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů
ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?Žƌ ‘ĐůŝŵĂƚĞƌĞĨƵŐĞĞƐ ? ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶs between environmental change and 
other migration drivers in SMPCs mean that migration may be towards rather than away 
from environmental risk. For example, there is large-scale rural to urban movement in many 
parts of the world, including SMPCs. This includes movement to large and growing cities in 
low-lying coastal areas in which migrants who are often residentially concentrated in poorer 
parts of these cities can be exposed to environmental hazard. In addition, rather than 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ďĞŝŶŐ Ă ƐŝŵƉůĞ  ‘ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌ ? ŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ĨŽƌ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐŽŵĞ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶ
SMPCs will either choose not to move or will lack the resources to move.  Indeed, 
environmental change may further erode resources at a household level that could facilitate 
migration. The article then assesses the implications of reframing links between migration 
and environmental change towards adaptation and resilience in the context of EU external 
migration governance.  
 
Building resilience: environmental change and migration as a security challenge 
The linked concepts of adaptation, vulnerability and resilience emerged in environmental 
science to explain the relationship between natural and social systems in the context of 
environmental change. This article argues that these concepts have analytical value when 
applied to other social systems, such as migration, but also that they can acquire particular 
meaning in the context of EU governance. For example, there may be a focus on the 
resilient individual in the context of neo-liberal governance able to enhance the 
ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽǁŶ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ  ?ŝĨ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ŵŽǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ŽĨ h
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member states (if they do) (Joseph, 2013). Within the environmental science literature 
within which these ideas have been particularly influential, adaptation is taken to refer to 
decision-making processes, sets of actions and associated capacities to deal with future 
changes to systems (Nelson et al. 2007: 397). dŚĞhE ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂůWĂŶĞůŽŶůŝŵĂƚĞ
Change (IPCC) defines adaptation as all actions to reduce vulnerability of a system, such as a 
city, population group, individual or household to adverse effects of anthropogenic climate 
change. An outcome of successful adaptation is resilience.  It has been argued that 
adaptation measures now, which may include proactive migration, can reduce the potential 
for forced movement in the future. Resilience can be understood as the amount of change a 
system can undergo while retaining the same controls on function and structure and 
maintaining options to develop (Nelson et al, 2 ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ? sƵůŶĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞŐƌĞĞ ƚŽ
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƐƵƐĐĞƉƚŝďůĞƚŽĂŶĚ ŝƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĐŽƉĞǁŝƚŚĂĚǀĞƌƐĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐ ?  ?ĚŐĞƌ ?  ? ? ? ? P
269). Maladaptation refers to the ways in which adaptation actions can also increase the 
vulnerability of other groups and ƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?ĂƌŶĞƚƚĂŶĚK ?EĞŝůů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? 
 
There has been increased interest in the international relations literature in the idea of 
resilience, for example in relation to the idea of  ‘governing from a distance ?. The notion of 
governing from a distance can be understood as a key strategic component of EU action on 
migration. A significant literature has emerged since the late 1990s that explores how and 
with what effects the EU has sought to develop policy interventions in the area of migration 
and border policy that have as their objective the intention of securing an effect in a non-
member state. The easiest and most obvious way to do this was through the enlargement 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƌƌŽƚ ?ŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚĂƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůŝŵƉĞƚƵƐƚŽŝŶƚĞƌŶal 
domestic change in applicant states. This has proven more difficult in countries without the 
prospect of membership and where, as Lavenex (2004, 2006) notes, the extension of the 
h ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ĚŽŵĂŝŶĚŽĞƐŶŽƚďƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚ ŝƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂl and legal reach 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĂƐƐƵƌĞĞĨĨŽƌƚƐĂƚĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞ ?>ĂǀĞŶĞǆĂůƐŽŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh ?Ɛ
external governance in the area of migration with a strong sectoral focus being clearly 
evident.  
 
The differentiation of governance means that patterns of interaction have acquired a strong 
sectoral focus, i.e. on the migration and border security sector, with the development of 
routinised and regular interactions between officials in various multi-lateral forums within 
and outside the EU system. Differentiated governance in the area of migration has also been 
supported and facilitated by international organisations such as the International 
Organization for Migration IOM) that provides migration management services to its  
member states. This is redolent of the tendency towards  ‘transgovernmentalism ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐ
been ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚŝŶĂƌĞĂƐŽĨ ‘ŚŝŐŚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐƚĂƚĞƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƚŚĞŬĞǇĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ
within which they operate has changed as a result of routine and regular interactions. This 
changes the strategic context for policy and may also have effects on the preferences and 
identities of actors involved in these interactions (Slaughter, 2004). Joseph (2013) sees such 
governance - or governmentality as he puts it - as consistent with a broader shift from direct 
forms of intervention to policies of  ‘disaster prevention ?. However, as this article shows, 
resilience is linked not only to disaster prevention, but also to the development of  ‘adaptive 
capacity ? deigned to pre-empt policy challenges. In the context of the external dimension of 
h ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƚŚŝƐ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ĂƐ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ  ‘ŬĞĞƉ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ƉůĂĐĞ ?
(Bakewell, 2008; Lavenex, 2004, 2006). tĂůŬĞƌĂŶĚŽŽƉĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂ ‘ƉĞƌǀĂƐŝǀĞ
5 
 
neo-libeƌĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇƐĞĞĂƐŵŽƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ
some of the mantras of global governance. Put another way, partners and stakeholders are 
ĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞĚƚŽ ‘ƚĂŬĞƚŚĞůĞĂĚ ? ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁŝůů  ‘ĚŽƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŐ ?(Joseph, 
2013: 5).  
 
This article explores the interactions between environmental and climatic change, migration 
and security in order to highlight the place of ideas about resilience in the external 
dimension of EU migration policy. The starting point is the very powerful scientific 
consensus that the world is getting warmer and that this will have important implications 
for the ways in which societies are governed and the ways in which states relate to each 
other in the international system (IPCC, 2013).  This evidence powerfully suggests that a 
warming world will lead to rising sea levels, changes in atmospheric chemistry, increased 
expanse of deserts, the melting of mountain glaciers and the increased occurrence of 
extreme weather events. Such events will draw into view complex issue linkages between 
institutional responsibilities and policy areas while also necessarily impinging on political 
decision-making. For example, some populations will clearly be exposed to the effects of 
environmental changes as rising sea levels may threaten coastal settlements while 
desertification will affect the sustainability of household livelihoods for millions of people in 
areas exposed to such changes. In total, hundreds of millions of people across the globe live 
in areas that render them vulnerable to such changes.  But the question is whether these 
people are forced to migrate? Interest in this question has ascended the policy agenda in 
recent years through notions such as the  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ? ? ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƌĞĨƵŐĞĞƐ ?
and  ‘ĐůŝŵĂƚĞƌĞĨƵŐĞĞ ? (El Hinnawi, 1985). In cases of fast-onset environmental changes such 
as natural disasters people will be forced to move. However, much environmental change is 
slower onset and its effects are likely to interact with a range of economic, social, political 
and demographic factors to affect migration outcomes (such as who moves, whether this 
movement is intra-state or international, the distance and duration of movement etc). 
These form the general parameters of the debate about environmental change and 
migration. We now move on to explore the political articulation of this debate and its 
relationship to debate about security and the external dimension of EU migration 
governance. 
 
The debate about the potential effects of environmental change on migration developed 
during the 1980s and 1990s and was driven by environmental scientists concerned about 
the effects of environmental and climate change on populations in affected areas. A key 
feature of this work was estimates of the numbers of potential migrants. These estimates 
ran into the hundreds of millions with the argument then developed that urgent measures 
needed to be adopted to protect those people that could be affected by such change. For 
example, it was argued that environmental change could lead to up to 200 million people by 
 ? ? ? ?ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƌĞĨƵŐĞĞƐ ? ?DǇĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?There was a tendency to represent 
such migration as a potential natural disaster requiring urgent measures to offset risk. These 
estimates were then used by campaign groups such as Friends of the Earth and Christian Aid 
to draw attention to the potential scale of the issues. Drawing from these perspectives and 
maintaining the security frame, it was also argued that environmental change could 
exacerbate conflicts and thus drives displacement and forced migration (Homer Dixon, 
1991, 1999).  
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While these estimates draw from only a very limited number of sources that themselves 
admitted their provisional nature, the projection of potentially large-scale migration became 
a notable feature of the debate about the human effects of environmental and climate 
change. Big numbers were, for example, taken forward by the influential Stern Report 
produced for the British government that reproduced the estimate of between 150-200 
million climate-related migrants by 2050, albeit by drawing from early provisional evidence 
rather than any substantial new analysis (Stern, 2006). As discussed below, there are good 
reasons to doubt some of these claims, but the point that is now developed is that the 
projection of large numbers of potential migrants did have effects on the EU political system 
given prevailing fears about the effects of large-scale migration.  
 
The research evidence and projections of numbers of potential migrants outlined above was 
designed to draw attention to the scale of the issues, but projections of hundreds of millions 
of migrants can just as easily fuel security-ĚƌŝǀĞŶƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?dŽ
take an example, in March 2008, the then EU High Representative for the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, Javier Solana, presented a paper to the European Council, entitled 
Climate Change and International Security (CEC, 2008). There was specific reference to 
 ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůůǇ-ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĞĚ ĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ŵŝŐƌĂƚŽƌǇ ƐƚƌĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽŝŶƚ ǁĂƐ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŚĂƚ
 ‘ƵƌŽƉĞ ŵƵƐƚ ĞǆƉĞĐƚ ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŽƌǇ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ? ?Not only could 
environmental and climate change lead to increased migration, but, more specifically, this 
would lead to large flows towards the EU. Moreover, this was then taken forward as a 
theme by foreign and security policy actors when it is also plausible that the issues could be 
understood as challenges for those dealing with development and/or climate policy (Geddes 
and Somerville, 2012).  
 
This security framing illustrates how policy makers often focus on the possibility that 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ‘ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌƐ ?ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽn (as opposed to internal 
migration), yet this proposition has been challenged by recent research evidence that 
suggests that the issues need to be reconsidered and resultant policy responses reframed 
(Foresight, 2011). In short, this research evidence shows how and with what effects 
environmental and climate change can drive migration, but also shows that their effects are 
more likely to be evident through interaction with other economic, social, political, 
environmental and demographic factors. The very strong influence of economic factors such 
as relative inequalities of income and wealth on migration decisions means that people may 
move for economic reasons towards and not away from risk. This can take the form of 
movement to urban areas in low elevation coastal zones that may themselves be exposed to 
the effects of rising sea levels. People living in areas that are affected by environmental and 
climate change may choose not to move or lack the resources to move while environmental 
change may further erode resources and could ůĞĂĚ ƚŽ  ‘ƚƌĂƉƉĞĚ ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶ ĂƌĞĂƐ
exposed to the effects of environmental change (Black et al, 2011; Geddes et al, 2012).  
 
These issues are likely to have powerful effects on the Mediterranean as it has significant 
dryland areas exposed to the effects of desertification combined with large settlements in 
low elevation coastal areas potentially exposed to the effects of rising sea levels. For 
example, more than 33 million people in SMPCs live in low elevation coastal zones that 
create exposure to the effects of rising sea levels. However, as noted, vulnerability to the 
effects of environmental and climate change should not be seen as a simple trigger 
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mechanism for large-scale displacement: some people may choose not to move or be 
unable to move while others may move internally to large cities. These outcomes arise 
because the effects of environmental change on both internal and international migration 
to, within and from SMPCs are likely to be indirect and occur through interactions with 
other potential drivers of migration (economic, social, political and demographic). Of 
particular importance are the effects of economic drivers, political upheaval and conflict in 
the south Mediterranean region that clearly have had and will continue to have powerful 
effects on migration.  These effects, however, are complex and could lead to displacement 
but could also erode the resources that allow people to migrate and thus mean that people 
are unable to move. In this latter situation, people may be trapped in areas where they are 
exposed to serious threats to their lives and livelihoods, including those arising from 
environmental change (although these may well not be the most immediate threats). 
 
The issue of resources (financial, physical and social) is central to migration decisions. 
Environmental changes such as the drying of land can have negative effects on resources by 
affecting livelihoods in rural areas while migration either internally or internationally can be 
a way of diversifying income in order to sustain livelihoods. Migration decisions are also 
likely to depend on social connections that link people in sending and destinations. We can 
now consider how this connects with the powerful global trend of rapid urbanisation. 
Migration interacts with this trend to the development of large cities. Although it is not 
always central to the analysis of the external dimension of EU migration governance, it 
could be argued that interactions between urban growth and migration (both internal and 
international) present some of the key and most pressing challenges but cannot be simply 
read as migration policy challenges. The EU Strategic Guidelines on Migration and Asylum 
(SGMA) agreed by EU member states in June 2014 focused mainly on external challenges to 
EU member states, but mentioned only demographic change and political instability. These 
can, of course, drive migration, but the Strategic Guidelines present only a partial picture of 
migration drivers. They neglect the key role played by relative income and wealth 
inequalities and also neglect the role played by social factors (such as networks) and of 
environmental/climate change. The SGMA thus reinforce the idea of migration as a threat to 
the EU by raising the spectre of instability and demographics as potential drivers of mass 
migration. The Guidelines neglect economic, social and environmental. They also neglect 
that the interaction between these various drivers may be a driver of internal migration 
(often towards large cities) or, alternatively, may mean that people are unable to move and 
ŵĂǇ ďĞ  ‘ƚƌĂƉƉĞĚ ? ŝŶ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽƌŝƐŬƐ  ?ŽĨ ƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ ?
environmental change, for example). A key point that emerges from this discussion is that 
migration (both internal and international) towards growing urban areas in SMPCs raises 
issues associated with the sustainability of urban environments, such as the provision of 
water, health, education and other services, the need for urban planning that protects the 
rights and well-being of migrants, and measures to secure tenure rights in both formal and 
informal settlements. In such terms, the development of  ‘adaptation ? and  ‘resilience ? as the 
frames for a response leads to a focus on options that include migration and non-migration 
policies such as the transmission of remittance incomes as well as measures to help sustain 
rural livelihoods such as irrigation systems that could help to maintain cultivable land. These 
ĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŽďĞĨŽƵŶĚŝŶƚŚĞh ?Ɛ^'D ? 
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By shifting attention from some supposedly imminent (albeit, in reality, unlikely) threat of 
mass migration to Europe, and by looking instead at the interplay in SMPCs between 
migration and key global trends such as environmental change and urbanisation it is 
possible to understand more about the emergent EU strategy of  ‘governing from a distance ? 
and the ways in which this ties in with ideas about vulnerability, adaptation and resilience. 
This then presents an alternative way of thinking about the effects of environmental change 
on migration by emphasising its multi-causal dynamics while also suggesting that 
environmental change is unlikely to be a simple trigger for migration.  
 
Vulnerable populations  
Central to the adaptation framework is the idea of vulnerable populations exposed to the 
effects of environmental and climate change. This section argues that it is possible to 
identify populations in SMPCs that are likely to be seen as vulnerable to the effects of 
climate change, but that this is not the same as identifying potential migrants because, as 
already outlined, migration is multi-causal and the effects of environmental change will 
interact with other factors such as economic and political change. The broader point is that 
EU external migration governance seeks to keep the vulnerable where they are by trying to 
find ways to promote their adaptation and build resilience. This also means relating 
international migration in the South Mediterranean to the broader social, economic and 
political changes within which it is nested and which provide the context for the impact of 
transboundary issues such as environmental change and migration on national and regional 
governance systems.  
 
The UN-Habitat Report on The State of Arab Cities highlights the potentially destabilising 
effects of environmental and climate change. Climate change is seen to possess the 
potential to destabilise the region through its effects on competition for scarce resources, 
food security, poverty, social instability, and resource conflicts. The UN-Habitat Report goes 
ŽŶ ƚŽ ŶŽƚĞ ƚŚĂƚ P  ‘ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ĐĂŶ ĂĨĨĞĐƚ ǁĂƚĞƌ ƐƵƉƉůǇ ? ĞĐŽƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ĞŶĞƌŐǇ
ƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ‘/t can disrupt local economies and strip populations of their 
ĂƐƐĞƚƐ ĂŶĚ ůŝǀĞůŝŚŽŽĚƐ ? ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ĐĂƐĞƐ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŵĂƐƐ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝůĞ  ‘ŝŵƉĂĐƚƐ ƚĞŶĚ ƚŽ
reinforce existing inequalities as a result climate change can disrupt the social fabric of cities 
and exacĞƌďĂƚĞƉŽǀĞƌƚǇ ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ? 
 
Dryland areas in SMPCs are exposed to the effects of both land degradation and climate 
change. Land degradation is a reduction in the suitability of land for agriculture as a result of 
erosion, salinisation or a decline in soil nutrients. These may be initiated by human activities 
such as farming, grazing and clearance for firewood, and may be exaggerated by periods of 
drought or flood. According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, between 10 per cent 
and 20 per cent of the wŽƌůĚ ?ƐĚƌǇůĂŶĚƐƐƵĨĨĞƌĨƌŽŵůĂŶĚĚĞŐƌĂĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?DŽƐƚĐůŝŵĂƚĞŵŽĚĞůƐ
simulate an increase in drought frequency across most of the dryland areas around the 
Mediterranean. An increase in the frequency of droughts reduces the productivity and 
reliability of agricultural and pastoral systems. Table 1 shows the percentage of population 
living in dryland areas in each of the SMPCs. 
 
 
Table 1: Percentage of the population in SMPCs living in dryland areas* 
Country WĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ?ƐƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶdrylands 
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Algeria 65.8 
Egypt 100 
Israel 100 
Iraq 100 
Jordan 100 
Libya 100 
Syria 96.2 
Tunisia 98.3 
* Data not available for Lebanon and Occupied Palestinian Territory 
Source: Stafford Smith et al (2011) 
 
Table 2 extends the analysis to show the extent of territory in each of the 10 SMPCs within 
low elevation coastal zones (LECZ) which is defined as the contiguous area along the coast 
that is less than 10m above sea level. In low-elevation coastal zones, environmental events 
like floods can affect whole communities, directly and indirectly impacting the lives and 
livelihoods of people who reside there.  For example, approximately 30 per cent ŽĨŐǇƉƚ ?Ɛ
population lives in the low-elevation coastal zones of the Nile delta. An overall total of more 
than 33 million people in the 10 SMPCs live in LECZs.  Table 3 further breaks down the data 
to explore the distribution of this population in LECZs between rural and urban areas.  
 
 
Table 2: Extent of LECZ in Southern Mediterranean countries and exposed population 
Country LECZ (km
2
) Exposed population 
Algeria 1236 739,375 
Egypt 21761 25,641,200 
Iraq 34658 2,664,710 
Israel 201 245,770 
Lebanon 66 679 
Libya 9550 645,381 
Morocco 238 1,739,490 
Palestine 21 72,214 
Syria 74 98,900 
Tunisia 4026 1,388,600 
TOTAL 37173 33,236,319 
Source: Vafeidis et al (2011) 
 
Table 3: Urban and rural populations in South Mediterranean countries within the LECZ, 
2000 
Country Population in the LECZ (km
2
) 
 Total Total urban Urban (%) Total rural Rural (%) 
Algeria 739,375 196,507 26.58 542,868 73.42 
Egypt 25,461,200 3,735,020 14.67 21,726,180 85.33 
Iraq 2,664,710 370,008 13.89 2,294,702 86.11 
Israel 245,770 80,894 32.91 164,876 67.09 
Jordan 679 3 0.44 676 99.56 
Libya 645,381 125,268 19.41 520,113 80.59 
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Morocco 1,739,490 202,621 11.65 1,536,869 88.35 
Palestine 72,214 0 0 72,214 100 
Syria 98,900 18,541 18.75 80,359 81.25 
Tunisia 1,388,660 355,506 25.60 1,033,154 74.40 
Source: Vafeidis et al (2011) 
 
To summarise, significant numbers of people in SMPCs are exposed to the potential effects 
of the drying of land and rising sea levels. However, as explored more fully in the next 
section, this exposure and subsequent potential for vulnerability does not necessarily mean 
that these people will migrate either internally or internationally.  It is in this context that 
we can begin to delineate the ways in which the security framing of EU migration 
governance can be challenged by the development of a framework that identifies vulnerable 
populations, makes different assumptions about the migratory potential of these 
populations ĂŶĚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞƐŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐĨƌŽŵĂĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?.   
 
Environmental change and migration decisions 
Environmental and climate change can affect migration decisions now and in the future, but 
their effects are more likely to be indirect and operate through their interaction with and 
effects upon other migration drivers (such as economic, social, political, demographic and 
environmental changes). For this reason, the terms  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐůŝŵĂƚĞ
ƌĞĨƵŐĞĞ ?are unlikely to be robust categories. Also, the presence of a potential migration 
driver does not mean that a person will migrate. As already noted, social, physical and 
financial resources facilitate or militate against movement while gender and other forms of 
social inequality can affect migration. As noted, this can give rise to challenges that are not 
ĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ŵĂƐƐ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ĂƌĞassociated with movement that can be towards and not 
away from environmental risk plus ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƌĞĂůƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨ ‘ƚƌĂƉƉĞĚƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŝŶ areas 
that where people are exposed to the effects of environmental change.  
 
Evidence suggests that economic factors are crucial in driving migration in ecological zones 
as diverse as drylands, mountain regions and low-elevation coastal zones, and in 
geographical regions as diverse as the Mediterranean and Asian mega-deltas (Chappell, 
2011). The nature of these economic drivers (and of their interaction with social, political, 
demographic and environmental drivers) has changed over the last fifty years. There is 
considerable uncertainty about how they will evolve and change in the future ŝŶ ƚŚĞ h ?Ɛ
SMPCs, linked not least to the outcomes of economic and political change. Political upheaval 
has been a key migration driver in SMPCs. Conflicts such as the Gulf Wars and in Israel, 
Palestine, Libya and Syria have all led to massive displacement. Conflict can also cause 
people to be trapped in areas rather than for them to be displaced, thus making conflict-
related movements particularly unpredictable, dynamic and hard to analyse.  This questions 
 ‘DĂůƚŚƵƐŝĂŶ ? ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů ƐĐĂƌĐŝƚǇ ? Žƌ  ‘ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂů
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ĂƐ ŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĚƌŝǀĞƌƐ ?The development of an adaptation perspective within the 
strategy of governing from a distance emphasises the capacity of households and 
communities in light of broader economic and socio-political factors. For example, water 
resources and water scarcity are important features of conflict in the eastern 
Mediterranean, but there is no evidence that water problems have caused local conflict that 
have led to migration. Indeed, a more pertinent question is why there has been so little 
migration as a result of water stresses in locations such as the divided territories of Cyprus, 
11 
 
Israel W est Bank and Gaza. One explanation is the use of alternative techniques, such as 
reduced water allocations to agriculture; increasing groundwater abstraction; household-
level demand/supply management techniques; increasing consumption of bottled water; 
ĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƚĞƌƐŚŽƌƚĂŐĞƐĂƌĞŶŽǁĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇŶŽƌŵĂůĂŶĚƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƚŚĂƚ
they are integrated into everyday life and experiences. For Palestinians, a further reason 
why water stress and conflict has not led to migration is  ‘the fear of losing the right to 
ƌĞƚƵƌŶƚŽƚŚĞtĞƐƚĂŶŬĂŶĚ'ĂǌĂ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů
presence within the homelanĚ ? ?^ĞůďǇĂŶĚ,ŽĨĨŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? ?: 1003). This is another example 
of how, for various cultural and political reasons, a group of people is unable or unwilling to 
leave their homes despite environmental vulnerability.  
 
The scale of movement and destinations 
Exposure to the effects of environmental change does not necessarily mean migration or, if 
migration does occur, it may be towards and not away from risk (i.e to a large city exposed 
to environmental risk). This section now examines the scale and time-frame of potential 
movement with a particular focus on environmentally vulnerable urban areas with 
assessment of the potential effects of environmental change on international migration. 
Such a discussion is shown to be particularly relevant in the context of tŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů
governance of migration. 
 
A key challenge is likely to be movement towards and not away from environmental risk. 
Rural-urban migration has been and is a central aspect of social change in SMPCs and 
environmental change may contribute to this process. The drying of land, for example, has 
negative effects on agricultural productivity and can lead to migration away from affected 
rural areas. Indeed, migration will often be towards urban areas whether or not the 
environment has been a factor in the decision to move.  Nonetheless, migrants may then 
become more exposed to other environmental risks and hazards due, for example, to the 
location of cities in low lying coastal areas and the concentration of migrants in informal 
settlements in areas of cities that are particularly exposed to such risks.  Table 4 draws from 
data in The State of Arab Cities to show projected growth through until 2020 in major urban 
areas in SMPCs with populations of more than 750,000 or that are projected to rise to more 
than 750,000. 
 
Table 4: Urban Agglomerations in the Southern Mediterranean with Populations of 
750,000 or More: Size and Rate of Change 2000-2020. 
 Estimates and projections 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Annual rate of 
change (%) 
Share in national 
urban population (%) 
2000 2010 2020 2000-
10 
2010-
20 
2000 2010 2020 
Algeria         
Algiers 2254 2800 3371 2.17 1.86 12.4 11.9 11.5 
Oran 705 770 902 0.88 1.58 3.9 3.3 3.1 
Egypt         
Alexandria 3592 4387 5201 2.00 1.70 12.0 12.0 11.5 
Cairo 10170 11001 12540 0.79 1.31 33.9 30.0 27.7 
Morocco         
Agadir 609 783 948 2.51 1.91 4.0 4.2 4.1 
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 Estimates and projections 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Annual rate of 
change (%) 
Share in national 
urban population (%) 
2000 2010 2020 2000-
10 
2010-
20 
2000 2010 2020 
Casablanca 3043 3284 3816 0.76 1.50 19.8 17.4 16.5 
Fès 870 1065 1277 2.02 1.82 5.7 5.6 5.5 
Marrakech 755 928 1114 2.06 1.83 4.9 4.9 4.8 
Rabat 1507 1802 2139 1.79 1.71 9.8 9.6 9.2 
Israel         
Haifa 888 1036 1144 1.54 0.99 16.0 15.5 14.9 
Jerusalem 651 782 901 1.83 1.42 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Tel Aviv 2752 3272 3689 1.73 1.20 49.5 48.9 48.1 
Jordan         
Amman 1007 1105 1272 0.93 1.41 26.5 21.7 21.2 
Lebanon         
Beirut 1487 1937 2090 2.64 0.76 45.8 52.2 51.4 
Libya         
Tripoli 1022 1108 1286 0.81 1.49 25.0 21.7 20.8 
Syria         
Damascus 2063 2597 3213 2.30 2.13 2.41 20.7 20.7 
Aleppo 2204 3087 3864 3.37 2.25 25.7 24.6 24.2 
Hamah 495 897 1180 5.96 2.74 5.8 7.2 7.4 
Homs 856 1328 1702 4.39 2.48 10.0 10.6 10.7 
Source: UN-Habitat (2012) Data for Tunisia not available.  
 
The State of Arab Cities observes, for example, that in pre-civil war Syria rural-urban 
migration was spurred by drought and environmental degradation and led to an estimated 
200,000-300,000 people moving to cities from the north east of the country between 2000 
and 2010, although this has been followed by massive displacement mostly to neighbouring 
states as a result of conflict. In Jordan the level of urbanisation stands at 78 per cent, with 
71.5 per cent of the total population resident in the cities of Amman, Irbid and Zarqa. Rapid 
industrialisation in Jordan during the 1970s and 1980s also contributed to urban growth. 
Around 500,000 of the 2m population of Amman had fled conflicts in Palestine and Iraq, 
which has placed pressure on resources. Much of the international migration to Jordan is 
refugees from the OPT, Iraq and, more recently, Syria.   
 
The critical issue that arises is not whether migration was motivated by environmental 
change, but rather whether the migration takes place in the context of environmental 
change. For example, drought famine or threats to agrarian livelihoods can generate a 
desire for out-migration from communities or settlements in the SMPCs. However, the 
effects of environmental change may also reduce the ability of people to move due to 
negative effects on household resources. International migration is relatively costly and 
requires substantial resources. People with subsistence-based livelihoods who have been 
adversely affected by drought or famine are less likely to possess the social, economic and 
human resources to engage in this form of migration.  Thus, environmental change may 
reinforce the tendency towards shorter-distance migration as opportunities to migrate are 
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generally reduced for those who suffer the impact of environmental change.  This means 
that the effect of environmental change and its interaction with other migration drivers is 
likely to be a reduction in migration options, and certainly to reduce longer-distance, 
international migration within the SMPCs and beyond. Thus, if EU external migration 
governance is based on the idea of some kind of imminent threat of mass migration then 
this is likely to be misplaced. Bakewell explores the impact of EU migration policy in 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to identify a preference for keeping people in their place, 
which diminishes the scope for people to use migration as a way of sustaining livelihoods 
(Bakewell, 2008).   
 
It is also important to extend the analysis to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which is relevant for 
SMPCs and for the EU in the context of the external governance of migration because of the 
idea that there is potential for onward movement to the EU. Much movement from SSA will 
relate to the effects of environmental and climate change although much of this migration 
will be internal and within states or relatively short distance to neighbouring states. Whilst 
the availability of assets will affect decisions about migration, in terms of scale it is likely 
that any movement towards the EU will be significantly smaller than movement within SSA 
states or to neighbouring states. For example, a study of the effects on migration of the 
1983 W5 drought in Mali showed a significant increase in short-cycle circulatory migration 
during this period, and that migration was a crucial strategy for the majority of families to 
get them through the drought (Findley 1994). However, overall migration levels remained 
constant because there was actually a reduction in international migration, mostly to France 
or nearby African countries, during this period. Similarly, the major drought in Burkina Faso 
in the early 1970s saw short term migration as a widespread response measure to diversify 
incomes; yet longer term and longer distance migration only increased during periods of 
higher rainfall, as this generated the capital to enable travel to occur (Hendry et al 2004).  
 
Building  ?resilience ? 
The external governance of EU migration has sought to export measures to neighbouring 
states, including SMPCs with a preference for keeping people in their place. This has meant 
that a focus for EU migration policy (necessarily linked to a range of other policy areas such 
as trade, development, agriculture and security) has been on building forms of resilience 
based on an understanding that migration represents a failure to adapt (a last resort) when, 
in fact, it might be better understood as a form of adaptation that can facilitate the 
movement of some members of a household in a way that helps to sustain the livelihoods of 
themselves and other family members, including those that stay behind and may, for 
example, receive income linked to migration (remittances).  
 
The article now moves to assess ŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůĂŶĚĐůŝŵĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞĂƐ ‘ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌƐ ?
of mass migration, which it is shown, neglect two other important potential outcomes: first, 
that people may move towards and not away from risk; and, second, some people may be  
trapped in areas that expose them to risk.   
 
Movement towards risk  
There are important challenges in relation to migration to cities that can occur in the 
context of environmental change (Foresight, 2011).  For example, Cairo is the only Arab 
mega city, which is usually defined as a city with a population of over 10 million people. 
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There are an estimated 20 million people in the Greater Cairo region. A key issue arising 
from urbanisation is informal settlement. In Cairo, 62 per cent of households were 
estimated to live in informal settlements (UN Habitat, 2012). More generally, many cities 
around the world, including in SMPCs and SSA, will experience growing populations as rural-
urban migration continues  W in some cases  influenced by environmental change, in some 
cases not. Such growing cities will in addition face increasing challenges from future 
environmental change, such as flooding, water shortages and coastal storms. Furthermore, 
new city migrants tend to be the most vulnerable as they concentrate in hazardous districts 
of cities. Migrants are often located in such settlements where there are low levels of water, 
health and other services. This does require effective urban planning plus measures to 
protect the rights and well-being of migrants. In a similar vein, Word Bank research has 
identified weak and unclear tenure rights in both formal and informal settlements as the 
most critical mechanism for city planners and governments to address in reducing the 
vulnerability of urban populations, including new migrants (Moser et al, 2010).  
 
Trapped populations 
There is ample research evidence to demonstrate that the poorest are least able to migrate.  
Furthermore, it is also recognised that the poorest are also likely to be the most vulnerable 
to environmental change (Smit and Wandel 2006). The Foresight report for the UK 
government synthesised these two outcomes to identify a group of people  W the poorest, 
with fewest financial/political/social assets  W who were simultaneously most vulnerable to 
environmental change, and yet their socio-economic situation means they have the fewest 
options to migrate (Foresight, 2011). This situation is represented in Figure 1 below.  
 
 
Figure 1: Representation of how the level of wealth/capital (social, economic or political) 
correlates with vulnerability to environmental change and can influence the ability to 
move  
 
Source: Foresight (2011) 
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If people who are vulnerable to being trapped do eventually migrate, then they are likely to 
do so in very vulnerable situations where they are exposed to social and financial 
exploitation, or may move to locations which are unsafe, environmentally or otherwise.  
Furthermore in many situations this group will not possess the assets to migrate and will be 
trapped in increasingly precarious environments  W often in marginal rural areas, but 
sometimes also in vulnerable urban locations. In this situation, an inability to migrate may 
actually mean that populations are more vulnerable to ex post displacement from 
environmental events.  It could then then be argued that the facilitation of migration would 
help to offset future problems of forced migration and displacement while also allowing for 
income sources associated with migration such as remittances, to help sustain the 
livelihoods of family members in affected areas. This is clearly an example of how the 
building of resilience can be framed as an adaptation response to the effects of 
environmental change on migration, but to do so necessarily draws in a wide range of policy 
areas that are not the normal focus for migration policy, including development and climate 
policies.  
 
This section now moves on to explore five areas of policy that all relate to the development 
of adaptive capacity and the building of resilience in the face of environmental and climate 
change ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĂǀĞĂĐůĞĂƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďŽƚŚƚŽƚŚĞh ?Ɛ'DDand SGMA but also, more 
broadly, to the ideas and practices associated with governing from a distance. First, 
measures will be required to address the long-term rate of change, including climate policy, 
policies that seek to reduce the impact of environmental change, and policies to build 
resilience to environmental change.  
 
A second set of measures focuses on adaptation in SMPCs to shortages of natural resources 
such as water and cultivable land for agricultural production. For example, an increase in 
irrigation has led to a large increase in agricultural productivity (Montgomery, 2009). The 
total irrigated area in Mediterranean countries (including SMPCs) doubled in 40 years to 
exceed 26 million hectares in 2005, which represented more than 20 per cent of the land 
under cultivation (Plan Bleu, 2009a). Access to irrigation has become the main driver for 
recent agricultural change in North African countries, and irrigation technology and 
experience has accumulated in this area. Awwad (2003) identifies economic drivers for the 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞŝŶŝƌƌŝŐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶEŽƌƚŚĨƌŝĐĂŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ‘ŽƵƚ-of-ƐĞĂƐŽŶ ?ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨǀĞŐĞƚĂďůĞƐĂŶd 
fruits, which is cost-effective because of high market prices and low labour costs in North 
Africa. 
 
A third set of measures concerns approaches that that seek to plan for and respond to 
migration influenced by environmental change, as well as to the challenges of movement 
towards (and not away from) risk, and of immobility. Of particular importance is planning 
for urban growth and adaptation, which includes dealing with tensions and conflicts 
associated with migration and, and potentially immobility, influenced by environmental 
change. This necessarily includes policies that focus on the welfare of new city migrants that 
may live in areas that are particularly exposed to environmental risk (Foresight, 2011). In 
light of this, it is particularly important to build resilience in urban areas exposed to the 
effects of environmental change within which migrants are more likely to live.  Policies that 
seek to address urban planning and governance are not migration policies per se, but are 
important in the light of future migration and environmental change, and may include: 
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effective urban planning and land use; the provision of health and education; measures to 
develop human security and social protection; and, measures to tackle vulnerability to 
environmental change. 
 
A fourth set of measures concerns responses at regional and international level to address 
protection gaps for those displaced, but here the effects on SMPCs have been relatively 
minimal. dŚĞhE ?ƐGuiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID) recognised that trying 
ƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚůĂǁ ?ĂƚĂŐůŽďĂůůĞǀĞůƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞĐŽƵůĚďĞůŽŶŐĂŶĚ
drawn-out process with no guarantee of success. Instead, a set of principles was developed 
through an expert-led consultative process. This avoided the need for negotiation and 
agreement at state level. The Principles were presented to the UN Commission for Human 
Rights in 1998, and have been endorsed by the UN General Assembly. They seek to provide 
protection from forced displacement, assistance during forced displacement and return, and 
resettlement and reintegration assistance to:  ?ƉĞƌƐŽŶƐŽƌŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or place of habitual residence, in particular 
as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised 
violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internationally recognised State bŽƌĚĞƌ ?. These Principles offer some scope for 
development of enhanced protection and assistance to those whose displacement is 
influenced by global environmental change. In 2009 the African Union (AU) adopted the AU 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa. The Kampala Convention, as 
it is known, is based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and is an important 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ůĂǁ ? ŝŶƚŽ  ‘ŚĂƌĚ ůĂǁ ?ĂƚĂ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů ůĞǀĞů ?ƌƚŝĐůĞ  ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
Convention stateƐƚŚĂƚ ‘^ƚĂƚĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐƐŚĂůůƚĂŬĞŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĂŶĚĂƐƐŝƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽ
have been internally displaced due to natural or human made disasters, including climate 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?tŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐŵŽƌĞƉŝĞĐĞŵĞĂůĂŶĚĚŝƐĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞĚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐŵĂǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ
to displacement influenced by environmental change, there are still limitations. The 
Kampala Convention has been signed by 39 and ratified by 22 of the ĨƌŝĐĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ  ? ?
members (as of November 2014). The GDIP are non-binding and their diffusion into national 
legal systems is not, as yet widespread. There are also extensive shortcomings in the 
institutions charged with implementing them and the exclusion of certain groups, for 
example non-citizens who are displaced within their host country. A further significant 
limitation is that, at the time of writing in March 2014, no SMPCs that are also AU members 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia) have signed the Kampala Convention. 
 
More ambitiously, a fifth set of policies could be pursued that recognise that migration can 
be a solution for people exposed to the effects of environmental change. There is only 
limited scope in the external dimension of EU migration governance for migration and 
ŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ? dŚĞ h ?Ɛ 'ůŽďĂů ƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ DŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ DŽďŝůŝƚǇ (CEC, 2011) does seek 
Mobility Partnerships that do not focus on migration in the context of environmental 
change but that could create scope for migration for primarily economic reasons that may 
be influenced by the effects of environmental change. These are, however, agreements in 
international law between the EU and non-member states and decisions about the numbers 
of migrants to be admitted remain a matter for the member states. Given that EU 
approaches have sought to stem rather than solicit migration, there is an obvious difficulty 
that arises when trying to see migration - and the encouragement of migration - as a form of 
adaptation rather than as a failure to adapt or as a potential disaster to be averted. As has 
17 
 
been discussed earlier, the h ?ƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŽĨŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶhas centred on strategies 
that seek to govern from a distance and to keep people in their place, if possible. One 
potentially significant development is the emergence of  ‘Mobility Partnerships ? that are 
agreements in international law between the EU and non-member states with provisions for 
flows of migrants (particularly for short-term or circular/back and forward flows). However, 
a significant constraint on such partnerships is that the numbers of migrants to be admitted 
remains strictly a prerogative for the member states (affirmed by Article 79(5) of the Lisbon 
Treaty).A Mobility Partnership with Morocco was agreed in late 2013 while one with Tunisia 
will be finalised in 2014.  dŚĞƐĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞh ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶtemporary and circular migration 
that may allow international migrants with a wide variety of skills to play a role in high-
income or emerging economies. In early 2014, the EU also reached agreement on a directive 
covering migrant seasonal workers, but, as with Mobility Partnerships, this does not all the 
EU to impinge on the right of member states to determine the numbers of such migrants to 
be admitted. Similarly, remittance income is not a panacea for development, but there is 
significant evidence of the role played by remittances as a source of international capital 
that helps households to sustain their livelihoods, particularly in rural areas. Remittance 
income has remained relatively stable in SMPCs in the aftermath of the post -2008 
economic crisis. Research for the UK government argued that:   ‘ZĞĚƵĐĞĚ ŽƉƚions for 
migration may cut off important forms of income support, such as remittances, and in the 
long run may make it unsustainable for households and communities to remain in situ, 
ultimately leading to a much larger migration at a later point, potentially in an unplanned 
ĂŶĚǀƵůŶĞƌĂďůĞǁĂǇ ? (Foresight, 2013).  
 
Conclusions 
This article asked how and in what ways environmental change and migration governance 
were defined as security challenges, examined the perceived nature of the challenge and 
also explored how new research has questioned initial perceptions. On this basis, the article 
then examined the ways in this new evidence about has informed perceptions of the 
challenges. This has implications not only for EU external governance of migration but also, 
more broadly, for the associated ideas and practices about governing migration from a 
distance and the differentiation of migration governance.  
 
The debate about the effects of environmental and climate change on human migration has 
been strongly driven by projections of the potential for large-scale migration. The impact on 
the policy agenda was for the issue to be viewed as a foreign and security policy issue with 
an emphasis on the need for pre-emption and/or controls to prevent large-scale migration 
ǀŝĞǁĞĚ ĂƐ ĂŬŝŶ ƚŽ Ă ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ? dŚĞ h ?Ɛ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ŐŽǀĞrnance of migration has thus 
pursued a range of policies that involve seeking closer collaboration with sending countries 
with the aim of keeping people in their place. In fact, the EU qua EU creates no possibilities 
for migration by people from non-member states as admissions remains a matter for the 
member states.  
 
The article then examined how and with what effects new research evidence has challenged 
the idea that hundreds of millions of people will be forced to migrate as a result of 
environmental and climate change. Rather than viewing such changes as a trigger 
mechanism for large-scale movement, this new research has argued that environmental 
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change needs to be understood as potential drivers of migration alongside other economic, 
social, political and demographic factors that can lead to migration. Moreover, the reasons 
that may cause people to move, may also be reasons that channel or direct this movement 
or that prevent people from moving. Thus the resultant challenges may be more complex 
than first thought and hold important implications for SMPs and for the EU. First, movement 
may be towards and not away from risk, particularly for economic reasons to large cities. 
Second, environmental change may interact with other factors to reduce the ability to 
migrate and can lead to situations where people are trapped in areas in which they are 
exposed to serious environmental risk.  
On this basis, the article argued that governing from a distance has acquired a new focus on 
adaptation and resilience that is consistent with governing from a distance, but that also 
places migration in the context of a broader range of factors and related policy challenges 
that can be associated with the human security components of adaptation and resilience. 
This was illustrated for SMPCs through assessment of exposure to risk, but also of key 
dynamics such as urban development.  It was argued that these are and - will increasingly 
become - central to EU strategies of governing from a distance, which in the context of the 
external governance of migration has involved a preference for keeping people in their 
places. This article suggested that such a preference tends to be based on an understanding 
of migration as a failure to adapt, but, an alternative reading could see migration as a form 
of adaptation, although measures to promote migration seem to be a bridge too far for 
policy-makers.  
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